US AIRWAYS 1549 DID NOT CRASH SOLELY DUE TO BIRD INGESTION!

Statistically an airliner crashing due to a simultaneous double bird strike is about as likely as being shot down by Martians with ray guns.

It is entirely possible that one engine struck bird[s] and failed, but any experienced flight instructor or professional pilot [and I am both] will tell you the major cause of losing both [of 2] engines on takeoff / climbout is pilot error – usually failing to properly identify which engine has in fact failed and which is still running – and then shutting down the “good” engine instead of securing the “bad.” In addition, there are other crew actions which could easily induce a compressor stall on the remaining “good” engine, resulting in the situation Capt. Sullenburger found himself confronting.

Moreover, it’s a matter of record that the #2 [right] engine had had a compressor stall only 2 days before, and no matter what the NTSB says at this point, that engine may not have been appropriately inspected / tested / repaired. As you can read in the recently issued Canadian air safety advisory, the only inspection method appropriate after a significant compressor stall such as the one 2 days before involves engine removal and disassembly, which was not done.

http://www.tc.gc.ca/CivilAviation/publications/tp185/1-06/Maintenance.htm

And ..... taking off with one marginal engine would dramatically increase the odds that even a single bird strike would have major consequences for both.

Unfortunately, explaining this crash solely or primarily due to bird ingestion shortchanges not only its passenger-victims but air travel safety as well.

But given the NTSB's "statement of facts" in the preliminary report, their investigation can only conclude one way. To wit [from the “fact” section of the NTSB’s preliminary report]:

“On January 15, 2009, at approximately 1530 eastern standard time, US Airways flight 1549, an Airbus Industrie A320-214, N106US, equipped with CFM engines, incurred multiple bird strikes during initial climb, lost thrust to its engines, and ditched in the Hudson River. The flight was a Title 14 CFR Part 121 scheduled domestic passenger flight from New York's La Guardia Airport (LGA) to Charlotte Douglas International Airport (CLT) in Charlotte, North Carolina. Visual meteorological conditions prevailed, and an instrument flight rules flight plan was filed. To date, of the 5 crewmembers, and 150 passengers on board, one serious injury has been reported. A total of twenty-six people were transported to hospitals, including two emergency response personnel. A final injury count is still to be determined.”

What's the problem here? Every statement in the preceding except the italicized is a fact and belongs in the fact section of the report. The italicized is hypothesis – supposedly what the investigation will prove or disprove. NTSB reports are written carefully; if hypothesis is stated as fact at the outset, it will almost certainly be reported as fact in the conclusion
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I urge you to read the transcripts just released of all communications between ATC [including LGA ground control and clearance delivery] and Cactus [US Airways] 1549. They tell us a lot, but they also raise many questions, especially – but not exclusively – for my fellow professional pilots who took their CRM training seriously, as I did. Here are a few:

1. If you lost all engines on climbout, what would be the first word out of your mouth when contacting ATC?

2. In the case of 1 – what’s the problem with the runways ATC is suggesting? What would you do / say to them?

3. In all your years of flying, how often -- at a busy airport like LGA -- did you forget to call clearance delivery before contacting ground control?

4. If you had a bird strike an engine on an a/c under your command and were about to ditch, why would you try to restart it below 2000’ agl with tas below 250K?

5. If a f/o with minimal experience in type were conducting the t/o from LGA, what would you be doing during the t/o?

6. Are you aware that the engines on US Airways 1549 were putting out 30% n1 [#1] and 10% n1 [#2] all the way down to splashdown? Isn’t it possible that #2 could put out only 10% because it had previously been damaged and / or struck bird[s] 2 days before and had not been properly inspected, tested, or repaired [as above]? And if #2 had been also putting out 30%, how would you assess your chances of landing at an airport vs. risking a splashdown?

7. What does it say about a pilot who does not repeat ATC clearances back to ATC exactly or darn close to how they had been given. Is this nitpicking or have there been severe consequences for not doing so?

8. Upon ditching, what would be a higher priority -- activating the ditching switch or taking the a/c logbook with you off the aircraft?

[For those of you who haven’t seen it, I urge you to watch this textbook video of a bird strike well handled:]

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=9KhZwsYtNDE

Here are a few more points to consider:

If US Airways 1549 really went down solely due to a double, simultaneous bird strike -- the accident will be considered an "Act of God", with only the birds [and maybe poor God ;-} ] to blame. Since there were no fatalities and only one serious injury [per what I’ve read so far] -- thank God! -- the passengers / victims will not be compensated in any equitable way for the trauma they suffered and the belongings they lost.

However, if there were system deficiencies which made the accident inevitable -- or transformed a fairly common and manageable occurrence [bird strike] into a potential tragedy [again -- pls. watch the above video], then victims can sue for -- and collect -- punitive damages if they have to.

More importantly -- if the only parties responsible are found to be God and the birds, the true cause[s] of this accident will not be addressed or corrected. And sooner or later they will result in a major tragedy instead of a near one.

The point here then is to recognize and address multiple system failures; rather than evaluate individual performances. There’s no doubt that Sully made a great splashdown. The problem, however, is that departing one of the world’s most challenging passenger airports with a marginal engine, an inexperienced f/o, and questionable cockpit discipline made that splashdown virtually inevitable.

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To be continued – expect more detail in the days to come. We welcome thoughtful questions and disagreement and will try to respond appropriately.